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ELITE CONFLICT IN THE POST-MAO CHINA**
I.

Introduction

Meeting in the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central
Committee (CC) during June 27-29, 1981, leaders of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) approved the long-awaited resignation of
Hua Guofeng as Party Chairman and demoted him to a junior
vice-chairman. 1 Meanwhile, the CC Plenum elected Hu Yaobang, 66,
a close confidante of China's most powerful man, Deng Xiaoping, the
new Party Chairman. Handpicked by Chairman Mao Zedong in his
final months of life, Hua had officially led China since Mao's death in
1976. Thus, Hua's replacement by a protege of Deng who twice fell
victim to Mao and his radical associates during the 1966-76 period
symbolizes the passing of Mao's era. As a matter of fact, the Party
gathering also approved a 35,000-word document, entitled "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party," which
critically evaluated Mao's career and sharply criticized his performance over the last two decades of his life, thereby further demythologizing the late Chairman. 2
In addition, the Plenum also made other leadership changes
which bolstered Deng's hand. Zhao Ziyang, 62, a pragmatist who
replaced Hua as Premier in September 1980, was promoted to party
vice-chairman. Deng himself became Chairman of the Party's
Military Affairs Commission (MAC), China's highest military decision-making body.
These changes are part of a master plan that Deng has been
painstakingly implementing ever since his political comeback in the
summer of 1977. Deng's central goal (or vision) is to modernize China
by the year 2000. To put it succinctly, Deng's master plan has three
major components. The first is to institute political reforms and
fashion bold, more practical, and less ideological measures designed
to speed up China's economic growth. The second is to eliminate or
** This is an updated and substantially expanded version of an earlier article,
"Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest" in Problems of Communism, Jan.-Feb.
1981, pp. 1-21. Portions of this study was also presented in a paper, with the same
title, to the Tenth Sino-American Conference on Mainland China, June 16-18, 1981,
sponsored by Institute of International Studies and Institute of East Asian Studies,
University of California <Berkeley). In my research and writing of this and earlier
studies, I have benefited much from the writings, comments and insights of H. Lyman
Miller, Ting Wang, A. Doak Barnett and Harry Harding, and I wish to thank them.
1. See Beijing Review, July 6, 1981, pp. 6-8 for the Plenum Communique.
2. Ibid., pp. 17-26.
(1)

2

CoNTEMPORARY

AsiAN

STUDIES SERIES

neutralize officials opposed to his policies, · and replace those he
considers to be inept or too old. The third is to install a team of
possible successors who are talented, pragmatic and in their "prime of
life" to guide China's destiny after Deng, now 77 years old, is gone.
To date, Deng has scored impressive gains on all of these three
fronts, notwithstanding the fact that these gains have fallen short of
his expectation. It should be also noted that all along Deng has been
encountering strong resistance in the Party and that the opposition
has at times compelled Deng to go sl~ or even to retreat. For
instance, many major political and economic reforms championed by
the Dengists have not been enacted or implemented.
This essay intends to study the struggle over power ahd policy in
China's post-Mao leadership. Specifically, it will analyze key issues of
contention in the leadership, identify individuals and groups with
diverse views and look at their conflict. It will also examine the
changing make-up of the leadership at the center, in the provinces
and within military ranks since 1977, and analyze the background
and outlook of the reconstituted leadership.

II. Deng's Political Resurrection
When Premier Zhou Enlai passed away in early 1976 after a
lengthy illness, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaopi~g, who had served as
de-facto Premier throughout 1975, was widely regarded as Zhou's
likely successor. Instead, he became the target and victim of an
anti-rightist campaign launched by the late Chairman and his
radical followers. Deng was vehemently attacked for negating the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), a radical crusade
launched by Mao since 1966, implementing a "revisionist" line that
sought to restore capitalism in China. 3 On April 7, 1976, the CCP
Politburo, at Mao's urging, ousted Deng from his leading party,
government and military positions, ostensibly for instigating a
massive riot in Beijing's Tienamen Square two days earlier. The
Politburo also named Vice-Premier Hua Guofeng, a political figure
then relatively unknown outside China, to succeed Zhou as Premier
and appointed him First CCP Vice-Chairman - a position which
enabled him to contend for Mao's mantle a few months later.

3. For analysis of the 1975-76 anti-Deng campaign, which has had considerable
bearing on political conflict and personal antagonisms in the leadership in recent
years, see Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Last Stand?", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), July-August 1976, pp. 1-17.
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After April 1976, according to sources inside China, Deng slipped
out of Beijing and fled to Canton where he was sheltered by Xu
Shiyou, commander of Canton Military Region. In south China Deng
met secretly with CCP Vice-Chairman and Defense Minister Ye
Jianying and provincial party and military leaders from Guangdong,
Fujian and Sichuan to discuss contingency measures to counter the
radicals. 4 Immediately after Mao's death on September 9, 1976, Deng
is said to have returned to Beijing to seek more support from other
provincial leaders attendint Mao's memorial service. Although Deng
did not have a direct role in the coup staged by Hua and Ye on
October 6 that resulted in the overthrow of the radical leaders, he
may have mobilized considerable support for that move beforehand.
Those who carried out the coup apparently acted with the knowledge
that there was support from many party and military leaders
throughout China for such a step.
As soon as the radicals were gone from the top leadership, Deng's
rehabilitation became an issue of controversy within high party
circles. In the wake of the radicals' downfall, he wrote a letter to the
CCP Central Committee, headed by the new Chairman, Hua
Guofeng, asking for a reversal of his case. But quite a few Politburo
members who had voted for his dismissal earlier and feared that he
would take his revenge against them tried to block his reinstatement.
One of them, Wu De(··.· mayor of Beijing, publicly called for a
continuation of the campaign against Deng in accordance with
Chairman Mao's previous behest. 5 Wang Dongxing, Mao's former
chief bodyguard, contended that the reversal of Mao's decision on
Deng would tarnish the late Chairman's memory. 6 In these and other
ways, Wu Wang, and their fellow Maoists- subsequently labeled the
"whatever" faction because, seizing and building upon some remarks
4. See a speech by Zhang Pinghua (Director of the CCP Central Committee
Propaganda Department) to a national conference of officials in charge of propaganda
and cultural affairs on July 23, 1978, published in Chungkuo Ta-lu (Taipei), No. 135,
Nov. 15, 1978, pp. 55. (The text has not appeared in the mainland medial.
5. Wu De made public speeches on October 24 and November 30, 1976, calling for
a continuation of the anti-Deng campaign. See Peking Review, Oct. 29, 1976, p. 13, and
Dec. 10, 1976, p. 11. It was also Wu who, on Apr. 5, 1976, had addressed the crowds at
Tienamen Square and had characterized the demonstration as a "counterrevolutionary" event.
6. Hu Jiwei (editor of Renmin Ribao), "The Struggle at the Higher Circles of the
Party," Chengming (Hong Kong), No. 34, August 1980, p. 51. This is a portion of a
classified speech that Hu made to the Central Party School on Sept. 13, 1979. None of
the speech has been published in the media inside China. See also Lo Ping, "The
Political Eclipse of the 'Whatever Faction'," ibid., No. 16, 1979, pp. 5-8.
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of Hua, they coined the statement that "whatever policy Chairman
Mao has decided upon, we shall resolutely defend; whatever instructions the Chairman has issued, and propagated it in the media, we
shall steadfastly obey"- attempted to invoke Mao's sacred authority
to prevent the rehabilitation of Deng and other GPCR victims.'
Confronted by this division within the Politburo, Hua wavered and
dragged his feet on Deng's demand.
Nevertheless, Deng's allies and supporters in the party fought
hard on his behalf. Xu Shiyou and Wei Guoqing (two powerful
regional leaders in the Politburo) and many provincial officials who
had been associated with Deng or had been brought back to power by
him in 1975 exerted immense political pressure on Hua to speed up
Deng's rehabilitation.
Eventually, a compromise was arranged by Ye Jianying at a
Central Committee work conference in March 1977. Deng was
formally reinstated to his three leadership positions in a Central
Committee plenum in July 1977, but in return he had to make a
major concession. He wrote a letter to the Central Committee in
which he pledged his support to Chairman Hua and conceded that he
had committed political errors in 1975. 8

III. Removing Ideological Constraints
Once back in the leadership, Deng, with the help of like-minded
colleagues, kept up the pressure for a revamping of policy and lost no
time in consolidating his position and expanding his base of support.
In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that since the
autumn of 1976, two broad trends have characterized Chinese
politics. On one hand, there has been a consensus within the
leadership to depart from Mao's revolutionary radicalism and to
promote the program of "four modernizations"- i.e., the modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and the
military. On the other hand, the elites have been divided about a
wide range of crucial political and economic issues which involve not
only ideology but also power. The resulting conflict has been largely,
7. The statement appeared first in a joint editorial entitled "Study Well the
Documents and Grasp the Key Link" in Renmin Ribcw, Hongqi, and Jiefangjun Bao
(all Beijing), Feb. 7, 1977.
8. See the Communique of the July 1977 Central Committee Plenum, Peking
Review, July 29, 1977, p. 5. Although the communique did not disclose the contents of
Deng's two letters or Ye's mediating role, such information had been widely
disseminated among cadres through inner party channels.
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but not exclusively, a rivalry between groups led by Hua and those
led by Deng.
The coalition under Hua consisted of two diverse elements (see
Table 1). One was the leftist "whatever'' faction, whose members rose
to political prominence during the GPCR and have had numerous
followers among the rank and file of the party. Another was the
"petroleum" faction, a group of economists and technocrats who ran
the Chinese economy under the late Premier Zhou's stewardship
during 1966-76, who were credited with the remarkable development
of China's petroleum industry, and have been strongly represented in
the economic ministries of the State Council. According to a Hong
Kong Communist publication, CCP Vice-Chairman Li Xiannian is its
behind-the-scenes leader. 9 In addition, the Hua coalition has also
drawn support from such elder statesmen as Marshal Ye Jianying
and from a few leaders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
This coalition was in the ascendancy during 1976-77 and largely
controlled policy councils until the spring of 1978. Indeed, the
political line of the 11th Party Congress in August 1977 and the
10-year National Development Plan sanctioned by the Fifth National
People's Congress (NPC) in March 1978 bore the mark of the
coalition's influence.
The coalition behind Deng, on the other hand, has consisted of
several groups of veteran officials, great numbers of whom were
victims of the GPCR. Many of them are long-time associates of Deng
(e.g., Hu Yaobang and Wan Li), some are Deng's peers and political
allies (e.g., Chen Yun and Peng Zhen), and some are cooptees into
Deng's group (e.g., Zhao Ziyang, Yang Dezih, and Keng Biao). While
these groups share intense antagonism toward Mao's legacy, they
differ on the ways and means of reform and the program of "four
modernizations."
It seems appropriate here to note parenthetically that these and
other leadership groupings or factions are based neither on institutions (e.g., the army or secret police) nor on historical associations
(e.g., field army ties). Perhaps with the exception of the "petroleum
faction" which is composed primarily of economic planners and
"technocrats," other groupings draw their members across the major
institutional lines and field army affiliations. Whereas allegiance to
Mao's legacy seems a crucial ingredient that holds together the
"whatever" faction and sets it apart from other factions, as a rule
9. Lo Ping, "The NPC Session and the Hu Yaobang-Zhao Ziyang Leadership
Structure," Chengming (Hong Kong), No. 34, August 1980, pp. 5-7.
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Chinese factionalism is not ideologically-oriented. Nor are China's
factions mainly policy-oriented, although they do entertain certain
policy preferences and such preferences could increase or damage
support for competing factions or affect factional alignments in
Chinese politics. Instead, the personal relationship of cadres, as an
insightful study by Lucian Pye has pointed out, is the primary basis
for factions in China since the advent of the GPCR. 10 In addition to
dimensions of Chinese personality and attitudes about authority,
trust, dependency and other sentiments which Pye attributes to
lingering influence of Chinese culture ·which impels the Chinese to
form close personal networks, Chinese Communist cadres have also
learned from the abrupt and unpredictable policy and political
changes in the past decade and half that personal ties and mutual
help, and not correct ideological stance or institutional loyalty, best
protect their careers and enhance political power.
Having close ties with many powerholders in the Party and the
PLA, and highly experienced in domestic and external affairs, Deng
clearly possesses personal and political assets unmatched by Hua or
other Chinese leaders. Besides, his modernization program seems to
better represent the national mood and enables him to win political
support. Thus, in the course of leadership infighting, the balance of
power has gradually but steadily shifted in the favor of Deng's
coalition. At the 11th CCP Congress, for example, Deng was
successful in bringing about the return of many veteran officials
sidelined by the GPCR to the Central Committee and the Politburo. 11
Hu Yaobang, Deng's closest brain-truster, was appointed director of
the powerful Central Committee Organization Department. Through
this key office, Hu was able to do two important things which not
only boosted enormously Deng's cause but also contributed much to
Hu's own rapid political ascendency in subsequent years: (1) rehabilitation of numerous cadres victimized by the GPCR; and (2)
dispensation of patronage and placement of supporters in major
10. Lucian W. Pye, The Dynamics of Factions and Consensus in Chinese Politics: A
Model and Some Propositions (Santa Monica, Ca.: The Rand Corporation, July 1980),
R-2566-AF, pp. 6-7.
11. Of the Eleventh Central Committee's 201 members and 132 alternate
members, 73 and 75 respectively are "new"- in the sense that they were not members
of the Ninth or Tenth Central Committees, elected in 1969 or 1973 -but had been
ranking officials before the GPCR. Indeed, quite a few were even members of the Eight
Central Committee, elected in 1956 and 1958. Two thirds of these veterans are Deng's
associates and allies. In the Politburo, 10·ofthe 23 members are new, and 6.ofthem are
Deng's supporters and allies.
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leadership posts. Likewise, Luo Ruiqing, another Deng cohort, was
named secretary-general of the CCP Military Affairs Commission to
control over the regime's military matters. Similarly, at the Fifth
NPC, Deng placed many allies and associates in key positions in the
State Council - including Zhao Cangbi as Minister of Public
Security.
One of the most important and far-reaching tasks which Deng
and his supporters have sought to accomplish is destruction of the
cult of Mao and dilution of Mao's ideological authority. In pursuing
this goal, they had two larger purposes: (1) to remove ideological
constraints on pragmatic modernization programs, resulting from
invocation of Mao by the opposition to stonewall against change; (2)
to undercut the major source of power possessed by Hua, whose claim
to rule rested on Mao's personal imprimatur.
With such an objective clearly in mind, the Deng camp,
masterminded by Hu Yaobang, since the spring of 1978 has been
promoting a new ideological tenet: "practice is the sole criterion of
truth." 12 In plain language, the precept means that any policy,
including any favored by Mao, should not be venerated as truth if it
does not work or if it fails to produce positive results. Rather, it
should be abolished or changed. Deng's clarion call is to "seek truth
from facts." In a system in which party and state constitutions have
sanctified Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding
ideology, the idea that Deng has been trying to foster is truly
iconoclastic and revolutionary.
As one might expect, Deng's promotion of the new precept
touched off quite a controversy in the Party. Such top leaders as Hua
and Ye refused to endorse Deng's formula. The "whatever" faction
and other defenders of the Maoist legacy attacked Deng for, among
other things, opposition to the late Chairman and trying to "cut down
the banner" of Mao Zedong Thought. At the same time, acceptance of
the need to base policy on actual conditions and to free the Chinese
people from the dominating influence of Mao's legacy was widespread. During the summer and fall of 1978, for instance, many
leaders, especially party and PLA leaders in the provinces, contributed articles to the media to register their support for Deng's new
ideological line. The issue was roundly debated in a Central
12. This new ideological concept first surfaced in an article in Guangming Ribao
<Beijing), May 11, 1978. Deng personally promoted it in a major speech to the Political
Work Conference of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in early June, See Renmin
Ribao, June 6, 1978.
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Committee work conference in November 1978. Deng subsequently
scored a major victory when a Central Committee plenum held
during the following month "highly evaluated the discussion of
whether practice is the sole criterion for testing truth." 13
Deng, however, has not hesitated to invoke Mao to constrain Hua
and dilute his influence as CCP Chairman. Thus, on July 1, 1978,
Renmin Ribao published a speech that Mao had delivered to a party
meeting in January 1962, in which he acknowledged that he had
made many wrong decisions on the Great Leap and was mainly
responsible for China's economic disaster during the late 1950s and
early 1960s. In the same speech, Mao had called for earnest
implementation of the principle of democratic centralism- namely,
collegial decision-making in the party committees- to prevent abuse
of power by individuals. Obviously, Deng publicized the speech to
show that Mao had not been infallible, and to justify modification of
policies which Mao had put forth. But by drawing attention to Mao's
emphasis on the principle of democratic centralism, Deng also sought
to curtail the power of Hua, who may well have derived special
prerogatives from his post as CCP Chairman.
IV. Purging the Adversaries

Deng and his brain-trust also plainly realize that their pragmatic
programs aimed at speeding up China's economic growth must have
the support of substantial numbers of power holders in the leadership.
Thus, in conjunction with his efforts to legislate a new ideological
line, Deng has been striving to establish control over the regime's
decision-making councils and policy-implementation processes by
pressing a purge of Maoists and of officials antagonistic to his
policies.
A concerted campaign that began in January 1978 against the
"wind faction," "slippery faction," or "faction of quakers" was part of
such a design. A series of articles which first appeared in Jiefangqun
Bao and was reprinted in Renmin Ribao mounted stinging attacks on
those cadres who were political opportunists, who shirked off
responsibility for past political errors and allegiances, and who hid
behind the positions of power awaiting an opportunity to create
political disturbance. 14 To put it simply, the targets of the campaign
13. "Communique of the Third Plenary Session in the 11th Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China" (adopted on Dec. 2, 1978), Peking Review, Dec. 29,
1978, p. 15.
14. Renmin Ribao, Jan. 6, 10, and 15, 1978.
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were those officials who had once supported and collaborated with the
gang of four and had then lined up behind Chairman Hua after
October 1976, or had otherwise dragged their feet on Deng's policies.
As subsequent developments would show, the campaign was directed
against at least half a dozen Politburo members, ten provincial first
party secretaries, and hundreds of other officials of somewhat lower
rank.
Chairman Hua, however, resisted Deng's efforts to purge the
leadership bodies. Aside from the fact that those under attack were
not only fellow beneficiaries of the GPCR but also his supporters,
Hua may have reasoned that an expanded purge would divide the
party ranks, destabilize the political order, and hamper efforts to
carry out the "four modernizations." Hence, he favored a winding
down of the campaign. His report to the NPC session in February
1978, for example, stated that the movement to expose and criticize
the gang of four had been "sound and vigorous" and that the
investigation into the individuals and incidents associated with their
conspiracy to usurp power "had in the main been completed in most
of the localities and departments." He called for the nation to be
conciliatory to comrades who "had made mistakes, including serious
mistakes," so as to "win over all those that can be won over." 15 In the
same vein, Ye Jianying, elected Chairman of the NPC Standing
Committee in March 1978, subsequently urged his fellow committee
members at a meeting in September 1978 to strive for national
stability and unity and admonished each and every one to refrain
from doing or saying "what isn't good for unity." 16 On several
occasions, moreover, Hua visited, and appeared in public with,
officials under the gun (e.g., Zeng Shaoshan and Xie Xuegong, party
first secretaries of Liaoning and Tianjin, respectively, on May 10 and
11, 1978), in an apparent effort to lend his support and save them
from ouster. But these undertakings were of no avail.
Notwithstanding the opposition of Hua and Ye, Deng was able to
purge those who had collaborated with the gang of four or were
otherwise antagonistic to his policies, and to consolidate his network
of support in the provinces. During 1978 alone, eight such provincelevel first secretaries and numerous secretaries were dismissed and
replaced by Deng backers. To be sure, Deng did not fire all of them at
a stroke. That could have harmed China's image of stability. What he
15. Peking Review, Mar. 10, 1978, pp. 17-18.
16. See New China News Agency (Beijing), Sept. 13, 1978; Peking Review, Sept.
28, 1978, p.3.
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did, to the contrary, was to undertake carefully controlled surgery.
He eliminated one or several at a time at intervals of several months.
Thus, Liu Zihou, Ren Rong and Wang Qian, first secretaries of Hobei,
Tibet and Shanxi respectively, survived until 1980. Similarly, even
when Seypidin and Wu De were relieved of their leadership positions
in Xinjiang and Beijing in January and October 1978 respectively,
they were allowed to retain their Politburo seats - at least for the
time being (see Table 2).
In retrospect, it was at the Central Committee work conference of
November 11-December 15, 1978, and the followup Central Committee plenum a few days later that the political forces led by Deng made
the big breakthrough in their drive to alter the party's ideological
and organizational features. This was the consequence of a welltimed political struggle orchestrated by Deng. During the summer
and fall of 1978, most of the leaders in the provincial party and
military hierarchy published articles to endorse Deng's ideological
formula "practice is the sole criterion of truth."~ 7 As the work
conference went into session, the Beijing CCP Committee passed a
resolution to affirm that the Tienanmen Square demonstration of
April 5, 1976, in honor of the late Premier Zhou, had been a
"revolutionary" event - thereby making heroes of the people who
either had taken part in it or were otherwise victimized by it (e.g.,
Deng), and casting a political shadow on Hua and others who took
actions to suppress it. 18 In the meantime, a spate of Deng-inspired
big-character posters went up in Beijing's Xidan "Democracy" Wall
which, among other things, denounced those leaders who were
responsible for arresting and persecuting the demonstrators, criticized Mao's leadership, and challenged the legitimacy of Hua's
appointment in the wake of the riots. 19
In such a political atmosphere, which obviously exerted heavy
political pressure on the Maoists and was favorable to the Deng
camp, many important personnel and political changes were effected
at the conference and the plenum. Four veteran officials - Chen
Yun, Deng Yingchao (the widow of Zhou Enlai), Hu Yaobang and
17. See, for instance, articles by WangEnmao, An Pingsheng, Ren Zhongyi, and
Wang Feng in Renmin Ribao Sept. 2, 7 and 20, and Nov. 4, 1978; Special
Commentator, "The Basic Marxist Principle,'' Jie{angjun Bao, June 24, 1978. Wang
Enmao, An, Ren, and Wang Feng were provincial first party secretaries of Jilin,
Yunnan, Liaoning, and Xinjiang respectively.
18, Renmin Ribao, Nov. 16, 1978.
19. See Fox Butterfield's articles in The New York Times, Nov. 17, 26, 27, and 28,
1978; Jay Mathews' articles in The Washington Post, Nov. 26 and Dec. 5, 1978.
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Wang Zhen, all of whom are certain to back Deng on mo~t issues were elected to the Politburo. The plenum also added nme veteran
cadres to the Central Committee; like Deng, all of them had been
victims of the GPRC. 20
Other personnel changes and appointments were even more
revealing. Chen Yun was named a CCP Vice-Chairman, a position
that he had held during 1956-66, and was placed in charge of a
100-member Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline, which
was to enforce discipline among party members. Furthermore, he was
appointed head of an ad hoc Financial and Economic Group, a body
assigned overall responsibility for China's economic and financial
policy. This was a highly significant appointment in light of Chen's
reputation as a seasoned economist, an outspoken critic of Mao's
radical Great Leap program, and the main architect of China's
recovery after the Great Leap. 21 One of the specific tasks assigned to
the group was to map out a three-year readjustment. program, for the
Chinese leaders now concluded that the 10-year National Development Plan, which had been formulated chiefly by Hua, Li Xiannian
and Yu Qiuli and announced at the NPC nine months earlier, was
unrealistic in its targets and unsound in its emphasis and allocation
of resources.
In addition, Deng's closest aide and most important braintruster, Hu Yaobang, was named Secretary-General of the CCP
Central Committee and concurrently Director of the Central Committee Propaganda Department. In the latter case, he replaced Zhang
Pinghau, a Hua supporter. Hu yielded his position as Director of the
Central Committee Organization Department to Song Renqiong,
another close associate of Deng. As CCP Secretary-General, Hu
became responsible for daily work at headquarters and supervision of

20. The nine new Central Committee members were Huang Kezheng, Song
Renquiong, Hu Qiaomu, Xi Zhongxun, Wang Renzhong, Huang Huoqing, Chen Zaidao,
Han Guang, ·and Zhou Hui. According to the 1977 CCP Constitution, Central
Committee members are elected by the Party Congress, but "in view of the changed
situation in party life" since the Party Congress and "current urgent needs in party
work," the Plenum decided, "in a provisional measure," to add these members to the
Central Committee, "subject to future confirmation" by the 12th Party Congress. See
Peking Review, Dec. 29, 1978, p. 7.
21. For an account of Chen Yun's career and his role at the Third Plenum, see
Parris H. Chang, Power and Policy in China, 2nd and enlarged edition. {University
Park, Pa.; Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), pp. 138-39; and Chengming,
No. 15, January 1971, pp. 21-23, and No. 20, June 1979, pp. 14-16.
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party organizations at all levels, and was thus better able to push and
implement the programs favored by the Deng forces.
According to reports of the Communist press in Hong Kong,
several Politburo members of the "whatever" faction came under
strong attack at the meetings for their ties to the radicals and lost
much of their political influence. 22 CCP Vice-Chairman Wang Dongxing, who had previously been Director of the Central Committee
General Office (which oversees vital party files) and had consequently been able to block the political rehabilitation of such ranking
leaders as Peng Zhen (former mayor of Beijing and Politburo
member), yielded the job to Yao Yilin, a close friend of Chen Yun and
Peng Zhen. Wang was also relieved of command of the 8341 army
unit, a formidable political weapon. Under Wang, this unit had
evolved into a special security force- a sort of praetorian guardwhich was in charge of leadership security but operated outside the
regime's established security apparatus and even ran its own
espionage network. 23 The unit is believed to have been disbanded in
1979. Others besides Wang who encountered much criticism and a
loss of influence include Wu De, Ji Dengkui, Chen Xilian, Ni Zhifu
and Chen Yonggui, all of whom had benefited from the GPCR.
Although Hua Guofeng retained his post as CCP Chairman th~n,
a number of developments at the Central Committee work conference
and plenum severely weakened his power and influence. First, those
leaders who had been his supporters or in alliance with him had lost
much of their power, and the party machinery came under the control
of Deng's men. Second, he lost many of the prerogatives of Chairman.
The plenum placed a new empahsis on collective leadership, and it
prohibited him from issuing "an instruction" without a collegial
decision. 24 Third, he had to make a self-criticism at the Central·
Committee work conference, in which he admitted a number of
political errors, including failure to act on Deng's rehabilitation in
good time. 25 Fourth, without saying so, the CCP discarded the
ideological and political line that Hua had put forth at the 11th Party
Congress in 1977 and at the NPC in 1978. Not only did the plenum
fail to endorse his "strategic decision to grasp the key link of class
struggle and bring about great order across the land" (Hua's political
22. Chi Hsin, "The CCP Made a Drastic Turn," The Seventies (Hong Kong), No.
109, February 1979, p. 8 and Chengming, No. 15, January 1979, p. 18.
23. Chang, Power and Policy in China, op. cit., pp. 234-36.
24. See the communique of the Third Plenum, Zoe. cit., p. 16.
25. Hu Jiwei, Zoe. cit., p. 62; see also Chi Hsin, loe. cit., p. 8.
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line after 1977) and the 10-year National Development Plan, but the
plenum communique was even conspicuously silent on the campaigns
to learn from Taching and from Tazhai, both of which Hua had
actively promoted as late as February 1978, when he exhorted the
nation to work hard to ensure that "by 1980 one third of our
enterprises become Taching-type enterprises and one third of our
counties Tachai-type counties."26
At the same time, the plenum endorsed Deng's ideological
precept of seeking truth from facts and voted to declare the April
1976 Tienanmen demonstration a revolutionary event and to revoke
the documents that the Central Committee had issued supporting the
anti-Deng campaign and condemning the Tienanmen demonstration.
It also overturned past verdicts on the late Marshal Peng Dehuai and
many other leaders purged by Mao and the Maoists, although it put
off decisions on the rehabilitation of two of the most prominent
Maoist victims, Peng Zhen and the late head of state, Liu Shaoqi. It
even made a limited, implicit, but unprecedented public criticism of
Mao, stating that "it would not be Marxist to demand that a
revolutionary leader be free of all shortcomings and errors," nor
would it "conform to comrade Mao Zedong's consistent evaluation of
himself." Nevertheless, it decided to postpone assessment of the
"shortcomings and mistakes" of the GPCR and called on the party to
shift its energies to the task of modernization. 27
It is of interest that in the last stage of the Central Committee
work conference, Peking and Washington reached an agreement on
diplomatic normalization, largely on the terms upon which the
Chinese government had insisted. This diplomatic breakthrough
could have strengthened the position of Deng, who had charge of the
negotiations, within leadership circles at a crucial juncture. It seems
likely that the Carter administration was aware of the struggle
taking place inside Chinese policy councils and went ahead with
normalization and issued the invitation to Deng to visit the United
States with an eye towards influencing China's leadership conflict
and towards helping the cause of a pragmatic leader.

V. Consolidation of Power
After the Third Central Committee Plenum in December 1978,
Vice-Chairman Deng emerged as the most powerful man in China
26. Peking Review, Mar. 10, 1978, p. 20.
27. See note 24, supra.
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and the main architect of China's modernization programs. Moreover,
his triumphant tour of the United States in January-February 1979
boosted his prestige enormously. Nevertheless, a series of developments afforded Deng's opponents an opportunity to mount a strong
attack on his leadership and policies.
·· ·
First, the poster campaign that the veteran officials had inspired
and exploited in the fall of 1978 had acquired a momentum of its own,
going far beyond what they had apparently int~nded. In the. winter
months of 1978-79, there was not only an increased outpouring of
posters but also a burgeoning of many undetgro\:md ·dissident
publications in Beijing find throughout China. Aside from demanding
democracy and human rights, quite a few posters and articles
expressed doubts about socialism, attacked repressive Communist
rule, and even went so far as to challenge the legitimacy of the
leading role of the CCP. Accompanying the rise of the dissident
movement were demonstrations by petitioners and sit-ins by discontented students, unemployed. youths, and others in Beijing and
various other Chinese cities, as many social elements besieged the
authorities with their grievances.
Second, China's punitive action against the Hanoi government in
the Sino-Vietnamese war of February-March 1979 did not proceed as
smoothly as the CCP leadership had anticipated. The heavy losses
sustained by Chinese troops generated a great deal of secondguessing and controversy within leadership circles. 28 Third, the
devaluation of Mao, the reversal of verdicts with respect to victims of
the GPCR, the new emphasis on material incentives and the role of
experts and intellectuals, and the regime's overall liberalization
created turmoil within party ranks. Not only did it generate
considerable confusion and cynicism, but it also severely antagonized
those whose interests were at stake.
Taking advantage of such circumstances, the Maoists in the
leadership sought to reassert themselves and launched an offensive
against Deng and his policies, especially those adopted at the Third
Central Committee Plenum. According to the Communist press in
Hong Kong, a number of provincial party s~cretaries and State
Council ministers who apparently felt tlielr vested interests
threatened·by Deng's new policies joined the atta~k. 29 This coalition
28. See Renmin Ribao editorial, Mar. 26, 1979; see also Jiefangjun Baa editorial,
Mar. 26, 1979, as translated in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Daily
Report: People's Republic of China (W~U~hington, D.C.), Mar. 27, 1979.
29. Lu Chung-ehien, "The Victory of the Pragmatic Faction as seen from the June
1979 NPC Session," Chengming, No. 21, July 1979, pp. 5-6.
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charged that the Third Plenum had ''negated Chairman Mao" and
"cut down the banner of Mao Zedong Thought," labeled Deng
"rightist" and "revisionist," and blamed Deng's promotion of liberalization for causing social turmoil and undermining stability and
unity. 30
Confronted with this challenge, Deng felt compelled to take a
step backward. In a speech to an enlarged Politburo session on March
30, 1979, he expressed strong support of the need to "uphold the
socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the
party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (the so-called
"four upholds" or "four basic principles."). 31
Consequently, the Chinese authorities carried out a crackdown
on democracy and on human rights activities and tightened political
and social control. Several of the more outspoken underground
journals were closed down, and some dissidents - including Wei
Jingsheng and Fu Yuehua, who have received much attention in the
Western media 32 - were placed under arrest. In quick succession in
March and April, many provinces, in the name of maintaining
stability and unity, issued notices banning demonstrations and
posters critical of the Party.
However, the left "adverse current" failed to reverse Deng's
major policies and did not deter him from continuing his efforts to
consolidate his position within the leadership. The opposition did not
succeed in accomplishing its end because it no longer carried
sufficient political weight in policy councils. Moreover, Deng clearly
enjoyed political backing of an extensive nature throughout the
system and was able to mobilize the necessary support to prevail. For
example, a large number of provincial party and PLA leaders spoke
up in support of his policies and attacked his critics in May and June
1979. 33
30. The viewpoints of Deng's critics are alluded to and refuted by many articles.
See, for instance, "Use the Spirit of the Third Plenum to Unify Our Thinking," an
editorial commentary in Wenhui Bao (Shanghai), Apr. 13, 1979; and "Distinguish the
Two Ideological Lines; Uphold the Four Basic Principles," by a ''guest commentator" in
Guangming Ribao, May 11, 1979.
31. Studies on Chinese Communism (Taipei), May 15, 1979, p. 22.
32. See The New York Times, Oct. 17 and 18, and Nov. 12, 1979, for dispatches by
its Beijing correspondent Fox Butterfield; see also Jay Matthews' dispatch from Beijing,
The Washington Post, Oct. 26, 1979.
33. The Deng-controlled media had prominently reported the remarks and
speeches of the officials. For example, see Renmin Ribao, May 23 (Zhao Ziyang), May
28 (Liao Hansheng), First Political Commissar ofNanjing Military Region), May 29 (Li
Desheng, Commander of Mukden Military Region), June 2 (Wan Li, First Secretary,
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By then, it appears that Deng had solidified his position
sufficiently to forge ahead again. Thus, Peng Zhen's long-awaited
rehabilitation was carried out, and at the Second Session of the Fifth
NPC in June, Peng was named a NPC vice-chairman and director of
the NPC's Legal Commission, with responsibility for restructuring
China's legal system. At the same session, three veteran economists
-Chen Yun, Yao Yilin and Bo Yibo- were elected vice premiers.
Three months later, the Fourth Central Committee Plenum, held on
September 25-28, elevated Peng Zhen to the Politburo; promoted
Zhao Ziyang, an alternate member of the Politburo, to full membership; and elected 12 more victims of the GPCR purge to the Central
Committee. 34 In addition, the plenum discussed and approved a major
policy document which reviewed the three decades of Communist rule
and addressed controversial issues which the Third Plenum had
sidestepped, such as Mao's leadership errors and defects of the CPCR.
The document is said to have been drafted by CCP Secretary-General
Hu Yaobang in June, circulated widely among the party cadres for
comments, and revised by Deng and Ye before it was finally
approved. Ye's speech on September 29 at a Beijing rally in
celebration of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the People's
Republic was based on the document. 35
The ascendancy of Deng and his supporters was manifested once
again when the Fifth Plenum met behind closed doors February
23-29, 1980, to deliberate on major policy and personnel matters. This
plenum approved the posthumous rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi (Mao's
chief antagonist during the GPCR), which had been an issue of
intense controversy within the leadership for some time. 36 It also
Anhui CCP Committee), and June 9 (Song Ping, First Secretary, Gansu CCP
Committee), 1979. On May 22, the paper reproduced a Jiefangjun Bao commentator's
article of the previous day which attacked Deng's critics and called for PLA cadres to
resolutely support and implement policies adopted at the Third Plenum.
34. With these additions, virtually every member or alternate member of the
Eight Central Committee who is still alive has returned to the Central Committee. The
few exceptions collaborated with the Lin Biao and the gang of four groups.
35. Lo Ping, "Developments in the Party After the Fourth CC Plenum,"
Chengming, No. 25, November 1979, pp. 5-6. Reportedly, divergent views persisted
among the elites on the assessment of post-1957 Communist rule. Consequently, the
antagonists had to compromise on or avoid some of the most controversial issues. For
Ye's speech, see Beijing Review, Oct. 5, 1979, pp. 7-32.
36. Several major political obstacles are said to have blocked the rehabilitation of
China's "Khrushchev," the label pinned on Liu during the GPCR, prior to the Fifth
Plenum. One was that the investigation report of the 1968 Central Committee
resolution which had condemned Liu as a "traitor, renegade, and scab" had been based
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made sweeping leadership changes. These included the ouster of four
leaders of the "whatever" faction- Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Chen
Xilian, and Ji Dengkui - from the Politburo; the elevation of two
close associates of Deng, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, to the
Politburo's Standing Committee; and the reestablishment of the CCP
Central Committee Secretariat and the appointment of Hu Yaobang
to be General Secretary and ten other veteran officials, most of them
Deng's associates and allies, to be secretaries to manage the daily
affairs of the Party. 37
The four diehard Maoists had been targeted for removal by Deng
since 1976, and, as previously noted, they had come under strong
attack at the Third Central Committee Plenum. Deng had temporized, possibly because he lacked sufficient power or because he
wanted to avoid a divisive leadership fight that could endanger
resolution of more pressing issues. HowevP-r, efforts to preserve an
appearance of leadership unity and resurgence of the Left in the
following spring had produced a curious sense of political uncertainty
in party ranks and had emboldened many cadres to oppose or drag
their feet on the programs that the Deng group wanted to pursue.
Hence, Deng had decided to strike against them immediately rather
than to wait until the next party congress.
VI. Grooming China's Future Leaders
It is no secret that because of Deng's advanced age, many cadres
had adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward his pragmatic programs.
They feared that just as the post-Mao leadership had done away with
on a report compiled by an ad hoc investigative group headed by the late Zhou Enlai.
Zhou, during 1977-78, had acquired the status of a new Communist saint in China,
and his name may have been invoked to block the restoration of Liu's honor. Another
major obstacle was opposition by Ye Jianying. Ye had to be confronted with new
evidence assembled by Liu's defenders showing that Kang Sheng had actually
controlled the investigative group, had extorted false charges from Liu's associates by
coercion and torture, and had framed Liu. (Kang, a party vice-chairman who died in
1975, has been expelled from the Party posthumously). Apparently, Ye agreed to Liu's
rehabilitation grudgingly, and when Deng held a memorial service for Liu on May 17,
1980, an event attended by virtually every top official, Ye chose to boycott it. Another
notable absentee was Xu Shiyou.
Information on the controversy described above is based partly on a quite
revealing editori~l, "Restore the True Feature of Mao Zedong Thought - on Liu
Shaoqi's Rehabilitation," Renmin Ribao, May 16, 1980, and partly on stories
circulating inside China which, in the opinion of the author, seem highly reliable.
37. See the Communique of the CCP's Fifth Central Committee Plenum, Beijing
Review, Mar. 10, 1980, pp. 7-10.
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Mao's programs, Deng's successors might scrap his "revisionist" line
and punish those who implemented it. To remove such reservations
once and for all and to prevent his adversaries from taking over the
leadership in the future, Deng has sought to structure his succession
in advance and to put into positions of power a group of possible
successors committed to his line and likely to continue his policies
after he is gone.
With this objective in mind, Deng installed his closest aide, Hu
Yaobang, as head of the Central Committee Secretariat and staffed
the Secretariat mostly with his supporters, whom he expects to hold
aloft his banner after he is out of the political picture. As a day-to-day
decision-making body, the Secretariat would run the Party and
preempt many of Hua's functions as CCP Chairman. Deng's evident
design then was to dilute Hua's control over policy and the party
organization, and eventually to ease him out of the chairmanship and
replace him with his own man, Hu Yaobang. Like Deng, Hu is
pragmatic, talented and imaginative, and he is also blessed with
extensive ties with the powerholders in the system.
As with the party councils, Deng has steadily packed the State
Council with his own backers and ousted his opponents. The NPC
Standing Committee in April 1980 appointed two of Deng's supporters, Zhao Ziyang and Wan Li, to be vice-premiers and relieved Chen
Xilian and Ji Dengkui of their posts as vice-premiers. Deng's next
goal was to force Premier Hua Guofeng out of the State Council and
to replace him with Zhao Ziyang. At 62, Zhao is a highly pragmatic
and experienced former provincial official, with a very successful
record as the leader of Sichuan, China's most populous province
(population over 100 million). Although he was not too closely
associated with Deng before the GPCR (as were Hu Yaobang, Wan
Li, and others), his pragmatism, his good record in Sichuan, and
especially his strong backing of Deng's programs apparently impressed Deng a great deal; hence, he has been coopted into the Deng camp.
To no one's surprise, the NPC in September 1980 approved Hua's
resignation as premier and appointed Zhao as his replacement.
The same NPC session also confirmed the expected resignations
of seven vice-premiers. These individuals included Deng Xiaoping,
Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Xu Xiangqian, Wang Zhen, Wang Renzhong,
and Chen Yongqui. Thereafter the State Council is in the hands of
Premier Zhao and senior Vice-Premier Wan Li. According to the
official view, all the resignations except that of Chen Yongqui, who
was in political disgrace (and was actually fired) were either designed
to separate party and government functions (as in the cases of Hua
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and Wang Renzhong) or due to advanced age (which applies to the
rest). 38 Obviously, this explanation contains more than a grain of
truth. There have been consistent efforts in recent years to eliminate
over-concentrations of power and to infuse leadership bodies at all
levels with younger blood and competent cadres. But such motivations alone do not account for the changes. Deng instigated these
changes in part to undercut his adversaries. That Deng has
maneuvered Hua into giving up his government post is already quite
well established. 39 What is little understood outside China, however,
is that Deng, by offering to step down from his government post on
many occasions, had sought to induce (if not compel) Vice-Premier Li
Xiannian to follow suit. Li, China's top economic official during
1966-78, had not seen eye to eye with the modernization programs
promoted by Deng and Deng's ally Chen Yun, and he had apparently
encouraged the "petroleum" faction to stonewall against Deng/Chen
attempts to readjust economic plans. 40 Li's departure from the State
Council (although he remains a CCP vice-chairman) is likely to
weaken the influence of the "petroleum" faction in the State Council,
and correspondingly strengthen the position of Deng's backers.
As a matter of fact, since the summer of 1980 several official
identified with the "petroleum" faction have come under heavy fire
from the Deng camp for their opposition to the readjustment
program. Yu Qiuli, a vice-premier concurrently director of the
powerful State Planning Commission, yielded his Planning Commission post to Vice-Premier Yao Yilin and became head of the less
important State Energy Commission. Deng's supporters also seized
upon the death of 72 workers in the capsizing of an offshore oil rig in
1979 to mount a strong attack on officials of the "petroleum" faction.
As a result of this attack, Petroleum Minister Song Zhenming
suffered summary dismissal, Vice-Premier Kang Shien received a
"demerit of the first grade" (a severe public reprimand), and Yu Qiuli
had to make a humiliating self-criticism .• , Apparently inspired by the
38. Beijing Review, Sept. 15, 1980.
39. Beginning in 1979, for example, Deng, through interviews with foreign
visitors and inspired press leaks, had expressed his desire to resign from the post of
vice-premier and had conducted a campaign to "persuade'' Hua to relinquish his
premiership.
40. See note 9, supra.
41. The actions taken against Song and Kang were prominently reported in the
Chinese media. See, for instance, "A Profound Lesson," Renmin Ribao, Aug. 27, 1980.
However,. the news that Yu made a self-criticism has not been publicly divulged,
although 1t has been known to many inside China.
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Deng camp, delegates at the September 1980 NPC session and a
spate of newspaper articles criticized the gigantic Baoshan Steel
project and other major construction undertakings for waste, faulty
investment plans and other deficiencies. It was perhaps no accident
that officials responsible for these projects were associated with the
"petroleum" faction. Furthermore, the alleged backstage boss of the
faction, Li Xiannian, was not spared. He was the target of attack in
the big-character posters in Beijing in the fall of 1980; and at the
Central Work Conference in December, he was compelled to recant
his errors and the text of his lengthy self-criticism was subsequently
disseminated. 42
In addition, Deng, who undoubtedly believes Mao's celebrated
dictum that political power grows from the barrel of a gun, has made
special efforts to establish control over the military. Soon after his
reinstatement as PLA Chief of Staff in the summer of 1977, he began
to place his supporters in key military posts. For example, Wei
Guoqing was appointed Director of the General Political Department;
Luo Ruiqing was made Secretary-General of the Military Affairs
Commission; and Yang Yong was named Deputy Chief of Staff. rY ang
Chengwu, who had served as defacto Chief of Staff prior to Deng's
return but has not been close to Deng, was transferred to the post of
Fuzhou Military Region commander). At the same time, Deng
undertook to purge many PLA officials (e.g., Chen Xilian) who had
collaborated with the gang of four or had opposed his policies, and to
replace those he considered inept or too old. Indeed, many old PLA
cadres have now been relieved of their leadership positions and serve
only as advisers to various military bodies. 43
Today, many veteran military men are highly apprehensive
because the military modernization program put forth under Deng's
aegis threatens their careers with its aim to retire "dead wood" in
favor of younger officers. Furthermore, there is widespread discontent
within military ranks about de-Maoization and other ''revisionist"
measures Deng and his associates have promoted since the Third
CCP Central Committee Plenum in 1978. Some PLA leaders who
42. See Pi Yun, "Required Readings for the Party Cadres- Speeches of the Four
Top Party Leaders," Chengming, no. 40, A February 1981, p. 15.
43. By the summer of 1980, more than 10,000 PLA ranking cadres, including such
officials as Deputy Chief of Staff Li Da, Deputy Air Force Commanders Xue Shaoqing
and Kuang Rennong, and Fuzhou Military Region Political Commissar Li Zhimin, had
stepped down from the leadership posts and become "advisers." See Huang Jung-yueh,
"Military Cadre Problems," Studies on Chinese Communism (Taipei), Aug. 15, 1980, p.
117.
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supported Deng's rehabilitation - notably Xu Shiyou - apparently
retain profound personal loyalty to Chairman Mao. They have
expressed strong reservations about sullying the memory of the late
Chairman, who was very much like a father to them despite all of his
failures and mistakes. 44
To cope with these problems, Deng has employed a variety of
means. He has pushed a campaign to strengthen political work and
"ideological education" among PLA officers and soldiers. Perhaps to
persuade the discontented cadres to support his policy of abolishing
life-long cadre tenure, Deng himself stepped down as Chief of Staff in
early 1980 and appointed Yang Dezhi, commander of Kunming
Military Region, as his successor. Since Yang had not been seen
particularly close to Deng but had performed well in China's war over
Xu Shiyou probably disarmed many of Deng's critics. Most important
of all, however, Deng has carried a big political stick and has not
hesitated to use it when necessary. In the past three years or so,
sweeping leadership changes have been made in the PLA hierarchy,
from the center down to the provinces. For instance, 10 out of China's
11 military regions have new commanders (the only Maoist-era
holdover is Li Desheng of Mukden Military Region, in Manchuria),
and the first political commissars in all eleven military regions are
also new. In addition, new appointees command 22 out of China's 28
province-level military districts. 45 Through these reshuffles, Deng
appears to have strengthened his control, although criticism of, and
resistance to, the current party line have continued.

VII. A Big Push for Reforms and Against Hua
Since the Spring of 1980, opposition to Deng and his programs
notwithstanding, the Deng forces have clearly dominated China's
political scene, preempted policy initiatives and shaped events
largely according to their own script. On the policy front, the most

44. See "Persist in Four Basic Principles and Continuously Emancipate Our
Thought," Jiefangjun Bao, Apr. 30, 1979, as reprinted in Renmin Ribao, May 3, 1979,
and the editorial in Jiefangjun Bao, Aug. 1, 1980, as transmitted by New China News
Agency <Beijing), Aug. 1, 1980. For Xu Shiyou's ambivalent attitude toward
de-Maoization, see his article "Chairman Mao Lives Forever in Our Hearts," Hongqi,
September 1978.
45. These statistics were culled by the author from Chinese national and
provincial press reports, and the compilation is believed accurate through the fall of
1980.
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important initiative of the Deng camp was to institute urgent
political and institutional reforms.
For instance, Deng and his supporters convened an enlarged
Politburo meeting during August 18-23, 1980, to deliberate on the
reforms of Party and state leadership system. On August 18, Deng
gave a keynote speech in which he called for (1) reforms, among
others, against bureaucracy, life tenure of cadres, over-concentration
of power, (2) steps to promote democracy, collective leadership and to
strengthen socialist legal system, and most important of all, (3) a
large-scale program to cultivate and promote cadres who are young,
better educated and professionally more competent. 46 To make room
for the younger cadres at the leadership councils, according to Deng's
proposal, veteran Party leaders in the CC and Politburo would move
to a central advisory committee (to be established upon the revision
of the CCP constitution) which would play mainly advisory and
supervisory functions. A similar advising body would also be created
in the State Council for the aging governmental officials.
In addition, Deng also proposed the reform of the economic
system. For example, changes are to be made on the economic
structure and the excessive centralization of control over economic
decisions in the government, and enterprises would be delegated
greater power. Going hand in hand with a greater emphasis on
experts are new management setup and greater participation by
workers designed to improve efficiency and productivity as well as to
strengthen accountability.
According to a CC circular, participants of the enlarged Politburo
meeting "unanimously agreed with the contents and spirit of comrade
Deng Xiaoping's speech," and submitted "many good supplementary
and amendatory opinions." 47 Subsequently, on August 31, a revised
text of Deng's speech was approved by the Politburo and on
September 11 issued as a CC document (No. 66) for dissemination
and discussion among party ranks. They were urged to convey their
views and suggestions to the Party center by October 15, so that the
CC, the NPC Standing Committee, and the State Council could
incorporate their inputs in the course of enacting new laws or
regulations. In the fall of 1980, China's mass media went on a blitz to

46. The full text of Deng's speech is reproduced in Studies on Chinese Communism, July 15, 1981, pp. 108-139.
47. Ibid., pp. 106-107.
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publicize and promote Deng's reform proposals. 48 Many Deng braintrusters also went around various forums to explicate and campaign
for his reform program. 49
While the Dengists were pushing for enactment of his reform
proposals, they also set the stage to oust Hua from the CCP
chairmanship. Soon after Hua stepped down as Premier in September
1980, they began to mount an attack on Hua's political and policy
errors in the media, although he was not attacked by name then.
There is no question that many of Deng's supporters resented the fact
that Hua remained CCP Chairman, even if he was only in office and
not really in power, for they saw him as the last vestige of Mao's
legacy. A two-part article by a pro-Deng historian, Li Honglin in
Renmin Ribao on September 18 and 19, 1980, openly questioned the
legitimacy of Hua's succession to Chairman Mao in 1976. Hua's major
justification for taking over Mao's mantle was that he had been
handpicked by Mao. As evidence, he has cited Mao's purported
statement that "with you in charge, I am at ease." The Renmin Ribao
article, however, said that "the system of succession which puts the
political destiny of a country in the hands of one man alone is
extremely dangerous." "The power of a leader," it went on, "is
bestowed by the people;" therefore, "he has no right to appoint the
successor to his post, which does not belong to him." Furthermore, not
only had portraits of Mao been removed from public places since
mid-August, but some pictures of Hua had also been taken down. The
most prominent one was that in Beijing's Central Railway Station,
which showed Hua and Mao together and symbolically represented
Mao's handing-over of the leadership to Hua.
As the late Chairman used to pontificate, a revolutionary leader
is not appointed; he has to emerge from the struggle. Hua's problem
has been that, despite his elevation to the Party Chairmanship under
the political exigencies of 1976, he failed to prevail in the subsequent
48. For examples, see Special Commentator, "An Important Reform on the Party
and State Leadership System," Renmin Ribao, October 28, 1980, and "Discussions on
promotion of Systemic Reform" in Guangming Ribao, October 16, 17 and 19, 1980.
49. See a speech by Feng Wenbin (Vice-President of the CC Party School), "On
Questions of Socialist Democracy," Renmin Ribao, November 24, 1980 (a condensed
version is also in Beijing Review, January 26, 1981, pp. 17-20, 28, under the heading
"Reforming the Political Structure.") See also a speech by Liao Gailong (member of the
office of Policy Research of the CC Secretariat) entitled "The Historical Experience and
the Path of Our Development" addressed to a "Forum on CCP History" attended by
theoretians from the party schools across the nation (section Four of his length speech
is published in The Seventies, no. 134, March 1981, pp. 38-48).
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struggles and thereby to prove that he deserved to be China's
supreme leader. A number of factors account for Hua's difficulties.
Because his training was limited and his leadership experience was
confined largely to provincial politics prior to the 1970's, Hua had not
been equal to the tasks thrust upon him. Indeed, his performance as
Party Chairman and Premier during 1976-80 was highly undistinguished. Moreover, in a system like China's, where personal ties are
the cement of political power, Hua simply lacks extensive networks of
such links with China's powerholders in the party and the PLA. True,
he did have the support of the "whatever" faction and of leaders like
Ye J ainying and Li Xiannian, but such support had not been
sufficient to enable him to meet Deng's challenge.
Besides, Hua has had a few skeletons in the closet, hence was
politically vulnerable. For example, he is widely believed to have
closely collaborated with the "gang of four" prior to Mao's death and,
as Minister of Public Security in 1976, he played an important part in
suppressing the Tienanmen Square demonstration of April 1976.
Thus, the trial of the "gang of four," which began in Beijing on
November 20, 1980, may have been used by the Deng camp as the
coup de grace against Hua. Although Hua was not a defendant
himself and was even instrumental in the arrest of the radical
leaders, the trial constituted the prelude to his ouster as Party
· Chairman as it was bound to produce evidence that would ruin his
political career. He made a deal and consented to st~p down.
In fact, between November 13 and December 5, 1980, the
Politburo held several meetings to denounce Hua. The bill of
particulars against Hua included: resistance to the reinstatement of
Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and other GPCR purge victims; accepting
and fostering the personality cult around himself while continuing
Mao's personality cult of the past through the promotion of the
"two-whatever's" policy; impetuously seeking quick results in economic work and pushing certain leftist policies; and suppressing the
discussion on the criterion oftruth. 50 Reportedly Hua was twice forced
to make self-criticism, conceding his errors, and agreed to step down
as CCP Chairman. In the end, the Politburo is said to have decided:
(1) to immediately suspend Hua from the leadership work as
Chairman of both the Party CC and Military Affairs Commission
(MAC), and to recommend to the Sixth CC Plenum that Hua be
removed from the Chairmanship of the Party CC and MAC, and be
50. Shu ping, "An Analysis of the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th Party
Congress," Studies on Chinese Communism, July 15, 1981, p. 22.
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demoted to Party vice-chairman; and (2) to empower Hu Yaobang and
Deng Xiaoping to henceforth take charge of the Party CC and MAC,
respectively and to recommend to the Sixth CC Plenum that Hu and
Deng be appointed Chairman of the Party CC and MAC, respectively.

VIII. Backlash and Compromise
Until the fall of 1980, Deng was able to call the shots and
dominate the political scene. However, the opening of the trial of the
''gang of four" and Lin Biao's followers (including four top PLA
generals) marked a sudden change of political climate in China, as
opposition to the Deng camp quickly coalesced. Emboldened, Hua
shifted his tact and openly challenged Deng's plan to unseat him. He
refused to attend a Central Work Conference in the second half of
December, which was supposed to endorse his resignation and
approve Hu Yaobang as his successor. Hua also boycotted the Party's
New Year's Day reception at Peking's Great People's Hall in order to
embarrass his detractors who had wanted to create an appearance of
leadership harmony and orderly transfer of power.
Moreover, behind the scene Hua sought to mobilize the support of
his allies and sympathizers in the leadership. One of Hua's powerful
defenders has been Marshal Ye Jianying, Party Vice-Chairman, who
collaborated with Hua to topple the radicals and put Hua at the top
in October 1976. Ye not only boycotted the Decembel.' Central Work
Conference, but also stayed away from Beijing for almost half a year
to disassociate himself with Deng's decision and display his opposition to Deng's power play. As can be expected, Hua also drew support
from those officials who owed their positions to Hua or those who rose
to political prominence during· the GPCR, and from the diehard
Maoists.
Even veteran Party officials, including those who were the
victims of the GPCR, also resented the reforms pushed by the Deng
forces and chose to block Hua's ouster. Many of these cadres have
faulted individual leaders like Mao, Lin Biao and the "gang of four"
(but not the communist system itself) for the GPCR and the
difficulties faced by the regime today and sought to restore the
pre-1966 system and policy. 51 Peng Zhen is known to be a representative figure of this "restorationist" school of thought. He and his
colleagues are said to oppose the "revisionist" reforms on the political
51. See Wang Juntao (a student of Peking University), "An Analysis of China's
Past, Present and Future," The Seventies, no. 134, March 1981, p. 69.
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system and leadership structure promoted by Deng, Hu, and Zhao
Ziyang.
Moreover, not a few officers of the PLA who opposed Deng on
various grounds also lined up behind Hua. They included those who
were disaffected by the cuts in military expenditures; those who were
resentful of Deng's repudiation of the GPCR and campaign for
de-Maoization and "revisionist" economy policy; those veteran officers
whose careers have been threatened by Deng's plan to retire the aged
and promote the young; and a large group of PLA officers, including
former associates of Lin Biao, who also felt the public trial of four
generals had tarnished the image of the PLA and were angry at Deng
and other party officials who had pushed for the trial.
Confronted with such strong combined opposition, Deng and his
supporters beat a hasty retreat. Thus the sentencing of the "gang of
four" and other culprits was delayed for more than three weeks as a
result of bitter debate inside the Party leadership, and the plan to put
their accomplice on trial has been postponed indefinitely, if not
altogether abandoned. The Sixth Central Committee Plenum which
was originally scheduled for late December 1980, and then February
1981, to formalize Hua's resignation and Hu's promotion had to be
postponed again and again amid the deepening political crisis and
other signs of uncertainty. Consequently, China's political pendulum
began to swing to the left.
Indeed, since the winter months of 1980-1981, Chinese authorities have once again clamped down on the democracy activists as
well as on intellectuals who have enjoyed relative freedom in recent
years in Deng's garden of "hundred flowers." Apparently trying to
appease his critics inside the Party and undoubtedly worried by the
nation's sagging economy, high inflation and huge deficit, antigovernment protests, civil disobedience, and other signs of social and
political unrest (including attempts by workers to organize the
Polish-style independent labor unions), Deng gave the first signal of a
crackdown in a harsh speech at the December 1980 Central Work
Conference. 52 Following Deng's speech, the Party issued a new set of
guidelines in February 1981, known as the No. 7 Central Document,
that imposed strict restrictions on the intellectual freedom of writers
and artists, and prescribed that their writings and artistic creations
52. Michael Weisskopf, "China Ends a Fling at Free Thinking," Washington Post,
March 23, 1981, pp. 1, 10; see also Tsai Dan-yeh, "Chinese Communist Literary Policy:
From Liberalization to New Clampdown," Studies on Chinese Communism, April 15,
1981, p. 78.
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must conform to the four basic principles of "party leadership,
socialism, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and proletarian
dictatorship." A subsequent Party directive, the No. 9 Central
Document, instructed the authorities to stamp out underground
publications and unofficial organizations. 53 In April 1981, the crackdown was well under way as a number of dissidents including Xu
Wenli, the editor of a prominent underground journal, AprilS Forum,
which had already ceased publication in 1980, and Wang Xize, one of
the authors of the "Li Ize" essay in 1974, were placed under arrest.
In addition, Deng has been forced to postpone or call off
important reforms which he and his supporters were actively
promoting as recent as the summer and fall of 1980. For example, the
highly publicized plan to reform the leadership system- to do away
with the life-long tenure of cadres and to fix the length of time the
leading cadres can serve - has to be shelved. Also the program to
promote to leadership posts younger cadres and experts provoked
considerable opposition from those affected, especially the PLA
cadres; consequently it has not been implemented in earnest.
Moreover, since early 1981, the publicity on the reform of economic
system in the media has been turned off and the policy to decentralize
decision-making power from the central authorities has been under
heavy criticism; and in some cases where decision-making powers
were given to enterprises have been rescinded.
The publication of a highly pro-Mao article in the Liberation
Army Daily on April 10 (and in other major Chinese papers the
following day) by General Huang Kecheng, formerly a PLA Chief of
Staff (purged in 1959) and currently the Executive Secretary of the
Party's Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline, also represents
a setback on the efforts at de-Maoization. It is true that the article
did criticize Mao for his mistakes in launching the Great Leap in the
late 1950s and the GPCR during 1966-76; however, the criticisms
were quite mild and the article actually tried to minimize Mao's onus
by placing the blame of these two major policy disasters either on the
entire leadership or on the "gang of four." 54 Most important of all, the

53. Tsai, loc. cit., p. 79; see also Liang Ming-chun, "Report from Peking: CCP CC
Documents, nos. 4, 7 and 9," Contemporary, no. 8, April 15, 1981, p. 43. See Special
Comm_enta~or, "An Important Reform on the Party and State L~adership System,''
Ren~mn R£bao, October 28, 1980. The economic reforms were played up during
National People's Congress session in September 1980; see Beijing Review, September
8, 15, 1980.
54. Renmin Ribao, April 11, 1981.
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article adopted an overall pro-Mao tone- it fervently defended the
memory of the late Chairman and strongly reaffirmed his leadership
and ideological authority. Placed in context, General Huang's
pro-Mao tilt was out of step with such Dengists as Hu Yaobang who
have campaigned since 1978 to repudiate the Maoist cult and
critically assess Mao's legacy as a necessary step for freeing China
from the shackles of Maoist influence, charting the nation's new
course and for fashioning pragmatic political and economic reforms. 55
Thus the publication of Huang's article (which provided a limited
rebuke of Mao) can be construed as a retreat by the Deng forces. Such
a retreat, in retrospect, seems to be a necessary concession to pave
the way to a new leadership consensus among China's disparate
elites. As a matter of fact, Huang's article did set the tone for the
party Resolution approved by the Sixth CC Plenum which passed
judgment on Mao's place in the annals of China's Revolution. The
Resolution, as pointed out before, leveled severe criticisms against
the late Chairman, but to many Chinese and Dengists, the critique
has not gone far enough. Not a few were particularly upset that the
Resolution states that Mao's "contributions to the Chinese revolution
far outweigh his mistakes" and that it upholds Mao Zedong thought
as the Party's "founding principle."
On the other hand, one can also argue that the compromise Deng
and his allies made was shrewd politics, for their concession removed
political deadlock that had blocked top leadership changes that they
sought after. After considerable hard bargaining among the factions
at a 10-day "preparatory meeting" prior to the plenary session, the
Sixth CC Plenum which met for three days in the last week of June,
approved Chairman Hua's demotion and Hu's elevation to Party
Chairmanship. This was, without question, a major victory for Deng
and Hu. However, it was only a limited victory, because they failed to
effect other personnel and political changes and had to settle for
much less than what they had wanted. For example, the plan to set
up a Party central advisory committee and to transfer (or kick
upstairs) Ye Jianying and other "old guards" to this largely honorific
body has not materialized. Likewise, the Plenum has postponed
55. Hu's inconoclastic assessment of Mao was reported in an interview in Tanjug
(Belgrade), June 21, 1980; see also recent articles expounding views of the Deng camp:
Special Commentator, "Rectifying the Guiding Thought on Economic Work - A
Discourse on the Leftist Errors in Economic Construction," Renmin Ribao, April 9,
1981; "Correctly Recognize the situation and policy, persist in Four Basic Principles,"
Hongqi, March 1, 1981.
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decision, if not rejected altogether, a proposal to make Deng China's
head of state and nominate him to serve as Chairman of the Republic
(which would necessitate a revision of the present state Constitution).
A number of major Dengist supporters, such as Wan Li, Yao Yilin
and Xi Zhongxun, also failed to win expected promotion to the
Politburo; although the Plenum elected Xi a Secretary of the CC
Secretariat, it did not make him the General Secretary as the Deng
camp had intended. There are other signs that the Plenum was only a
temporary and uneasy truce among the rival political forces, and soon
after the Party gathering they have renewed their conflict. 56 Hence
further leadership and policy changes will occur at the 12th CCP
Congress scheduled for next year, if not before.
We should also take note of an ominous development - it is
Deng, and not the new Party Chairman Hu Yaobang, who has taken
over the Chairmanship of the Military Affairs Committee, a post used
to be held concurrently by the Party Chairman (as was in the cases of
Mao and Hua previously). Many PLA leaders are known to be
strongly antagonistic toward Hu, and some have even questioned his
credentials to be their commander. Thus the unusual arrangement
can be seen at once as a conciliatory gesture to avoid further
aggravating the relations between Hu and the PLA, and a forceful
show of Deng's political support for his protege.
How long will Deng, at age 77 now, be around to support and
protect Hu, then? Can Chairman Hu survive politically after his
56. Amid the reports circulating inside China on the resumed leadership clashes
on August 18, 1981 editors of Renmin Ribao, the organ of the Party CC, published a
self-criticism confessing errors for not criticizing Bai Hua and other writers in good
time. Bai, a Party member who works in the Culture Department of Wuhan Military
Region, is a playwright; his movie script, "Bitter Love," which depicts a painter who
returned to China from America in the early 1950's to work for the motherland, but
was persecuted to death during the GPCR, angered many cadres and touched off quite
a controversy. On Aprill7, 1981, for instance, the army paper Jiefangjun Bao took the
lead and published a stinging editorial, denouncing Bai, among other sins, for
unglifying socialist motherhood, blackening the image of the Party and the country,
and defaming people's army. On April 18, and 20, the army paper published more
articles to attack Bai. On the other hand, many students in Peking and Shanghai rose
to defend Bai and criticize the military authorities' attempt to clamp down on
intellectuals. Reportedly, Hu Yaobang also defended Bai and urged a more tolerant
attitude toward the writers and artists, lest the regime risked further alienating the
intellectuals. To disassociate with the army's stance and to allay intellectuals' fear of a
new crackdown, the party leadership (through the All-China Writers' Association) even
cited a poem of Bai Hua in 1979 for an award. Against such a background, the
self-criticism by Renmin Ribao would indicate that the party leadership has submitted
to the military pressure and leadership conflict has intensified.
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mentor is gone? How will he perform as Party Chairman? Can he in
time develop his own political strength and convincingly demonstrate
his stewardship, thereby proving to his allies and critics that he
deserves to be China's supreme leader? These are crucial questions
that will have bearing on Chinese politics. If Hu fails to perform, he,
too, may suffer Hua Guofeng's fate.
IX. The Reconstituted Leadership
Since his political comeback in the summer of 1977, Deng has
steadily restructured China's leadership. Several salient characteristics of the reconstituted leadership are clearly discernible.
First, the "old guards" predominate in the leadership bodies at
all levels. These veteran officials were victims of the GPCR purges
and have been rehabilitated only in recent years. Deng's restoration
to power has seemingly legitimated their raison d'etre, and their
political resuscitation symbolizes a stinging repudiation of Mao's
rule. As a group, they are quite old, largely in the 70s and late 60s. In
the Politburo, for example, the average age of the members is over 70
(see Table 3). While the average age of the Secretariat members is
slightly younger, it is still above the mid-60s. The picture is
much the same for the leaders in the provincial party apparatus and
in the PLA hierarchy. 57
Ironically, the flood of rehabilitations has pushed out many
younger cadres who were promoted during the GPCR. To be sure,
there is a policy of persuading old cadres to step back into the
so-called "second or third line," and of promoting middle-aged and
young cadres to leadership responsibilities at all levels, and some
beginnings have been made in this regard. 58 However, progress is
57. According to Chinese sources, the average age of PLA cadres at the army level
is over 60, at the division level is over 55, at the regiment level is over 50, and at the
battalion level is over 35. Moreover, the average age of leadership cadres in the
Military Affairs Commission and the major military organs is between 65 and 75. See
Wu Liping, "A Major Reform in the Cadre System," and Special Commentator, "Be a
Promoter for Reform of the Cadre Structure," Hongqi, Nos. 10, and 11, 1980.
58. See Hua Guofeng's speech to the September 1980 session of the National
People's Congress, Beijing Review, Sept. 22, 1980, pp. 26-27. It is interesting to note
that such senior military region commanders as Xu Shiyou <Canton), Yang Dezhi
(Kunming), Han Xianchu (Lanzhou), and Wang Pizheng (Wuhanl have been replaced
by young PLA officers. Except for Qin Jiwei <Beijing), Yang Chengwu <Fuzhoul, and
Wu Kenhua (Canton), who are in their late 60s, the other eight commanders <six of
them appointed in 1980) are in their mid-60s or younger. In addition, these 11 military
region commanders and many other newly appointed military district officials are
Korean War veterans.
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slow, for resistance among veteran cadres is quite strong. It is
obvious that political stability and effectiveness of the Peking (or
any) regime depends ultimately on the promotion of young, worthy
"revolutionary successors," hence the failure of the Chinese Communists to systematically infuse new blood into the top ruling bodies will
have long-term adverse effects.
Second, supporters (real or imagined) of the "gang of four" and Lin
Biao - including those labeled the "wind faction," the "slippery
faction," and the "quakers," as well as those diehard Maoists who
opposed the current pragmatic policy line -have been ousted from
the leadership bodies at all levels. 59 Their removals solve some
problems for Deng and his colleagues but create others. Among these
newly purged officials are many relatively young cadres who were
promoted during the GPCR decade, and their treatment runs counter
to the policy of opening up leadership positions for the middle-aged
and the young. Most serious of all, half of China's 38 million party
members joined the Party after 1966, and a large number of them,
strongly inbued with Maoist values, have been alienated by the
wholesale dismissals of GPCR "upstarts,'' which they see as an
assault on their belief system and a total negation of their political
interests.
Third, there is a trend toward specialization of functions and
separation of party and government (or military) work. This is
particularly discernible at the provincial level. Now the party first
secretaries in all of China's 29 province-level administrative units no
longer hold the top government posts concurrently (as was invariably
the case during the GPCR and until 1978). In the same vein, with the
exception of Tibet, no PLA officers are concurrently top provincial
party or government leaders. At the height of the GPCR, in contrast,
PLA officers headed 21 out of the 29 province-level administrative
units and constituted the backbone elements in all of them.
Fourth, in spite of the ascendancy of veteran officials and Deng's
predominance, factionalism continues, and.conflicting vie_~~ints on
59. At the provincial level, quite a few officials who were guilty of graft, abuse of
power, corruption, and other irregularities and misconduct have also been dismissed.
Moreover, some officials who were in the "wrong" jobs and did not perform as expected
have been moved to different localities or departments. An outstanding example is the
transfer of Xi Zhongxun from the post of First Secretary of the Guangdong CCP
Committee in November 1980. Lin Hujia, Party First Secretary and mayor of Peking
was also replaced in eatly 1981, for he had conflicts with CCP General Secretary Hu
Yaobang and transferred to Minister of Agriculture (for hints of the friction between
Lin and Hu, see Renmin Ribao, Nov. 19, 1980).
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major policy issues persist. This factionalism exists in the Party, the
government, and the PLA hierarchy. In party policy councils,
different approaches to economic construction are represented by
Deng, Hu Yaobang, Chen Yun and Zhao Ziyang on the one hand, and
by Hua, Li Xiannian, and the "petroleum" faction on the other. Even
among the Dengists, differences also exist - with Chen stressing
readjustment of policy priorities, while Hu and Zhao placing heavy
emphasis on the reform of economic system and institutions. In the
government, the "petroleum" faction is strongly entrenched, as its
members control many of the economic and industrial ministries;
they have resisted the changes in economic priorities (tilt toward
agriculture and light industry) and economic cutback in recent years
and are strongly against structural reform. Until the Sixth CC
Plenum, China's elites have differed markedly on de-Maoization, on
the reform program of Deng and on the future of Hua. A compromise
was reached on some of these issues at the Plenum, but a deadlock on
others has persisted. In the PLA, opposition to Hu Yaobang as new
CCP Chairman is quite strong. Many PLA officers have blamed Hu's
support of liberalization and campaign on de-Maoization for having
generated the crises of belief, confidence and trust in China and
continue to apply strong pressure to force him to crack down on the
writers who ventured to criticize the regime. In addition, many
former associates of Lin Biao, now out of political favor, are severely
discontented.
Last, but not the least, has been the highly publicized Deng-Hu
policy of recruiting and promoting people of greater professional
competence into leadership positions in order to implement the
program of "four modernizations." Already such policy has been
manifested in the new government appointments in which experts,
scientists and cadres with strong professional background were
promoted to provincial vice-governors, vice-mayors, department
chiefs, and to vice-ministers and a few ministers at the central
government level. What has been done is unquestionably a step in
the right direction, but it is still too slow and too little. To modernize
China, the Chinese leadership needs a vast number of experts and
technocrats in major positions of responsibility in the government
and in the party councils. As pointed out before, many veteran cadres
who are more "red" than ''expert" are reluctant to step down and
have fought against the Deng-Hu efforts to make changes in
personnel and policy.
It is probably not unique in China that those who have already
succeeded in ensconcing themselves in positions of power strive to
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stay in power. However, certain historical, cultural and systemic
factors may have rendered the elite circulation and upward political
mobility even more difficult in China. There is no question that the
veteran cadres today played major leadership roles during the
Communist movement and made the revolution, hence they claim
they are entitled to positions of responsibility in the postrevolutionary China. Top leadership posts also go to the veteran
cadres because the Chinese Communists (with the exception of the
radicals) still respect age and seniority, their criticism of Confucian
ideas notwithstanding. It is well known in the PRC that those in the
high positions enjoy many "perks," special privileges (e.g., education
and job opportunities for children) and services (e.g., housing);
naturally, they are reluctant to retire.
All of these factors have, furthermore, been reinforced by
Chinese Communists' creed and organizational principles. The Party
is the self-appointed "vanguard of the proletariat," it monopolizes
political power and outlaws political opposition and is not subject to
the pressures for change that operate in democratic societies. By the
system of democratic centralism, those at the top are "centralizers"
and they perpetuate themselves at the summit of power.
Like Mao, the "old guards" who are running China were master
strategists and organizers of revolution. Whereas they excelled in the
battlefield and were experts at creating organizations, conducting
political campaigns, and manipulating human relations, their record
and writings betray little genuine understanding of the requirements
for China's industrialization and modernization. These revolutionary
leaders were probably indispensable at the initial stages of postrevolutionary consolidation of power, but they have been awfully
inadequate and deficient in providing leadership for China's modernization drive since then. With industrialization and its concomitants of higher educational attainment and increasing differentiation and specialization of function in the economy and the state
administration, it would have been necessary to bring into the party
leadership more and more of the new functional specialists. So far,
this has not happened. In addition to the aforementioned reasons
which hamper the upward political mobility of the junior members in
the elite circles, the emphasis on redness over expertise and the
anti-intellectual biases of Mao and many of the Veterans have
operated against the recruitment of elite from the society at large.
The failure of the power elite to co-opt the talented members of the
better educated and technical intelligentsia into its ranks is likely to
retard China's modernization efforts.
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X. Looking Ahead
In some respects, the struggle for power in the Chinese political
system in the post-Mao years has become less violent and more
"routinized,'' now that the Chinese leaders try to establish and follow
the "rules of the game." Hua's "resignation" provides a good
illustration of this point, as well as an important precedent for the
future. For the first time in more than three decades of Communist
control, the Party Chairman has been toppled in accordance with
some procedures, and his exit is accorded "courtesy,'' as Hua was
allowed to "resign" and stay in the Politburo. In fact, already for a
number of years now, it has been a fairly common practice not to
totally disgrace the defeated political rivals - high officials ousted
from positions of power have been allowed to keep the Politburo or
Central Committee membership, or reassigned to less powerful or
important posts.
Whether or not they still wield any real power would probably
vary from one case to another. The point here is that they, unlike
those "capitalist roaders" during the GPCR and the "gang of four"
since October 1976, are not in jail or under house arrest. The effect of
this would tend to create a growing body of "counter-elite" who can
wait in the wings and plot their political comeback. Take the case of
Hua who, at 60, is among the youngest in the Politburo today and
still vigorous. In the years to come, he would still be seen as a Maoist
standard bearer, the logical leader of the Maoists and the beneficiaries of the GPCR (most are "outs" or in eclipse) and, as such, will
represent a political alternative to Hu Yaobang or whoever is in
power. The existence of counterelite not only will place greater
restraints on the incumbent but also will make it more difficult for
him to consolidate his power.
Futhermore, partly because the consequences of defeat in a
power struggle will not be death as was in Stalin's Russia, nor even a
terrible sanction as was under Mao, personal and factional conflict
in the post-Mao leadership has intensified. Factions and cliques
existed in the CCP leadership in the course of the Communist
movement. During the 1950s, the impact of personal historical
associations and of factional conflict on policy was less salient, as the
leadership was able to maintain a high degree of discipline and
coherence. However, Mao's drive to recapture leadership control since
the 1960s and his use of the tactics of "divide and rule, check and
balance," while permitting him to maximize control, have fostered
and intensified the factional cleavage. Such leadership division and
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rivalry encouraged by Mao's manipulative approach appears to have
outlived Mao and is likely to plague his successors for years to come.
One major debilitating development in China's political system
in the past decade has been the fragmentation of leadership power.
The trend was already evident in the final years of Mao's life but has
deteriorated further in recent years. It is quite obvious that today
Deng, not to mention Hu, lacks the authority of Mao to generate
personal power, or the power of Mao to create personal authority.
Mao was both the ruler and the high priest (chief ideologist) of
Communist China - performing several important leadership roles
(policy initiation, policy legitimization, conflict resolution and political integration) and the paramount function of a "law giver." In
contrast, neither Deng nor Hu is an established ideologist, and no one
in China today can combine all of Mao's roles. Unquestionably, there
is a discernible decline in power and leadership status of Mao's
successors. However prominent Deng may appear since 1978, he has
been only first among the equals and has had to share his leadership
roles with, and in turn constrained by, such leaders as Ye Jianying,
Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and, to a lesser extent, Peng Zhen and Hua
Guofeng, at one time or another. Hu wields even less power under
Deng's shadow and, making virtue out of necessity, has preached
collective leadership on many occasions. The fact that Chairman Hu
no longer holds the position of Chairman of MAC seems to attest to
increasing differentiation of leadership roles and fragmentation of
power among Chinese elites.
Fragmentation of power can lead to many adverse consequences.
It tends to breed leadership disunity and limits its capacity to map
out and implement forcefully strong reform measures needed for
many of China's deep-seated problems. The need to accommodate all
factions and to compromise on divisive issues on personnel and policy
has forced the Chinese leaders to "muddle through" without really
taking unnecessary measures to solve problems. This in turn has
adversely affected the ability of the regime to perform services and
deliver goods to the society, thereby generating greater popular
discontent. Chinese people are experiencing a severe crisis of belief, a
crisis of confidence and a crisis of trust; these in turn contribute to a
crisis of authority in Chinese leadership. The deepening of China's
authority crisis has paradoxically compelled the regime to invoke the
authority of Mao, even though that authority has already been
tarnished and has been dysfunctional for a society striving for
modernization. Moreover, the authority crisis diminishes the ability
of the regime to elicit policy support and compliance through
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persuasion, and may (and did) force the regime to turn to coercive
means of control and pay special attention to the PLA to insure its
loyalty to the party leadership.
Many indicators of a praetorian regime are apparent in the
Chinese political system today. 60 One such indicator is the propensity
for the military to intervene in political arena. In response to the
GPCR, the PLA was deeply and extensively involved in Chinese
politics. In October 1976, the PLA thrust itself into the political
arena again as it took part in the coup that ousted the radicals and
threw its support behind Hua making him Mao's successor. The
propensity for the PLA leaders to get involved in leadership conflict
resolution or to intervene in political affairs is also evident in the
publication of Huang Kecheng's article and several other editorials
and commentaries in the Liberation Army Daily in recent months
which attacked the Party's liberalization policy.
Although Deng has been remarkably successful in recent years
in pushing the PLA "back to the barrack" and in keeping the PLA
opposition in check, his success seems to be due more to personal
factors (e.g., personal ties) and may thus be difficult to duplicate by
others. Many precedents have been established for PLA intervention
in a political struggle; moreover, the Chinese Communists have been
unable or unwilling to maintain strict civil-military institutional
boundaries. Thus, if the Chinese leadership fails to arrest and remove
the trend toward praetorian politics, China's PLA leaders can be
expected to intervene more forcefully in future leadership conflict.
Like the 1976 coup, some of the PLA leaders could again play the role
of "kingmakers," or some may even aspire to become kings themselves.
60. Some ~f the indicators are: political participation is "not moderated and
channeled toward common goals by the reliable functioning of political institutions;"
political institutions are "weak, lacking in the moral authority to work out binding,
allocative decisions that will be regarded as legitimate by the society as a whole;'' and
there is "a tendency for the military to intervene in the political arena." See Claude E.
Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule (North Scituate, Mass.:
Duxbury Press, 1974), p. 54. See also Samuel Huntingdon, Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 196-197, for a similar
definition.

Table 1: Chinese Leadership Factions Since 1977
Positions in government

Positions in party
Pohtburo

Central
Committee

Secretarial

Other

Slale Council

NPC

MAC

PLA hierarchy

.

I. "Whatever" sroup
Hua Guolen1

Member. SC

Chaorman

(resign. 6181, elected Vice-Chmn.)

Premier
(restgn. 91801

Wang Dongxtng

Member. SC
!oust. 218D1

Vice·Chmn.
(oust. 21801

Dorector. CC
General OHice
(OUSI. 10/781

Wu De

Member
!oust. 21801

Member

1st Secretary,
8eijtnl Commil.
(oust. 101781

Chen Xlhan

Member
(oust. 21801

Member

Vice-Premier

Jt Denskuo

Member
!oust. 21801

Member

Vice-Premier
(oust. 41801

Chen YoniiSU'

Member

Member

Vice-Premier

Remarks

Positions in militaty

Cha~rman

(resign. 6/8) .
Cmdr "834i"SI
(oust. 121781

~
Member, SC

~

Cmdr Betjtnl MR
(OUSI. 1180)
I sl Pol. Commis ..
Beittnl MR
(OUSI. 11!781

is:
~

(oust. 91801
Member

2nd Secretary,
Beojong Commit.
(oust 121781

Chana Pinghua

Member

Director, CC
Prop. Dept.
(oust. 121781

Quo Yulens

Member

Director. CC
Ora. Dept.
(oust. 121781

Ni Zhilu

Member

I
z

Vice-Chairman
(oust. 4180)

(OUSI. 41801

0

Pres,. All-China
Fed. ol labor

0

~

~
~

2. "Petroleum" faclion

I

li Xiannian
Yu Qiuli

I

Kans Shi'en

I

Chen Muhua

I

Gu Mu

Member, SC

Vice-Chmn.

Member

Member

All. Member

I

I
I

Member

Member

I

Member

I

Member

I

Member

Vice-Premier
!Resign. 91801

I

I

Vice- Premier;
Director,
Energy Com.
Vice-Premier;
Min., Slale
Econ. Com.
Vice-Premier;
Min .. For. Econ.
Relations
Vice-Premier;
Min., Cap11a1
Consl. Com.
(oust. 121801;

I
Replaced by Yao
Yilin as Dir., State
Plan. Com. 8180
Public reprimand
8180

C":!

0

~

l'J

~

0

~

Min., For. lnv
Control Com.

Lin Hujia

I

Tans Ke

I

Son1 Zhenming

Min., Agri.
lsi Secrelary.
Beijing Commil

Under attack,

(transfered

Member

Min., Metallurg.
Industry

2/81)

I

~

00

Under attack

~

~

rn

M1n., Petroleum
lnduslry
(oust. 81801

~

tj

Sun Jingwen

M1n . Chemical
Industry

Under allack

[;3

Wang Lei

M1n., Commerce

Under attack

rn

UJ

.

3. Pragmattc coalitton

~

A. Deng Group

UJ
Member, SC

Dens. X1aop1ng
Hu Yaobang

Member. SC

Vtce-Chmn.
Member

Vtce-Premier
(res,gn. 9180)

General

(elected Chmn. Secretary
6/81)
Zhao z,yang

l'J

I

Member. SC

Member

(elected VIceChmn. 6/81)

Dir .. CC Org.
Dept !77-78);
D1r, CC Prop
Dept ( 78-79)
I st Secretary,
Sichuan Commit.
(75-79)

I

Premier

Vtce-Chmn.

(elected
Chmn. 6/81)

Chief of Staff
hesisn. l!BDl

Wan l•

I

Wei Guoqins
Gens B•ao
Pens Chons
Fans y,

I
I

Hu Qiaomu

Sons Renq•ong

Member

Member

Member

Member
Member

Member

Member

M.ember

Wang Renzhong

B Chen Yun Group

I

I
I

V1ce-Premier

Member

Member

Member

Member

Member

Director, CC
Drs. Dept.

Member

Member

P~reclor,

Member. SC

Dir., Gen.
Polit. Dept.

Sec. Gen .. SC

Min., Defense
Vice-Chairman
Vice-Premier;
Chmn., Sci. &
Tech. Com.

Member
Member

I

,.Member, SC
Member, SC

I

a0

AF Commander
Chief of Staff

I

~

Pres , Chinese
Academy of Soc.
Sciences

t::(")
!o3

z

CC
Prop. Dept.

Vice-Premier
(resisn. 9tBOl

Head. CC
F•nan. & Econ.
Group: lsi Sec .•
Disc. Inspect.

Vice-Premier
(res•sn. 9tBOl

~

l'J

'"C

Member. SC

Chen Vun

Sr. VIce-Premier;
Min., Agric.
Commission
V1ce-Cha~rman

Member

I
I

I

Member

Member

Member

Zhans Tingfa
Yang Oezh•

Member

Vice·Chmn.

0

~I

a::>

Com.
V•o Yilin

l,lo Vlbo

c. Pena Zhen aroup

Member

Director. CC
Generll Office

Member

I

I

Pens Zhen

Ulanhu

Member

I

I

Member

Member

Member

Member

D~r., CC United
Front Dept.

0

a

I

Vice-Premier;
Min., Stale
Plan. Com.

I

Vice-Premier;
Min., Mach·blda.
Ind. Com.

I
I

I

I

I

I

I ~>

V1ce-Cha~rman;

Chmn., NPC
Lepl Com

V1ce-Chairman
I

Co:!

(0

~

4. '"Elder Statesmen"'
Ye Jianyina
Xu Xianaqian

Den& Yingchao
Nie Ron12hen

I

I

Member. SC

Vice-Chmn.

Member

Member

Chatrman
Vice-Premier &
Oef. Min.
(reSign. 9180)

Vice-Chmn.

Hua ally: ••••nst
de-Maoizat•on

Vice-Chmn.

Member

Member

Vice-Chairman

Member

Member

Vice-Chairman
(res•gn. 91801

Aaa~nst

ll•ce-Chmn.

de·
Maoization

I

Member

Member

Xu Shiyou

Member

Member

U Deshong

Member

Member

Wan& Zhen

Ji Pen&fe•

0
0

5. "Independents'"

I

Member

V•ce-Premier
(resign. 91801

Member, SC
Member, SC

D~reclor.

CC
lntntl liaison

Against de·
Maoization
Cmdr.
Guanazhou MR
(oust. 1180)

Alienated Oeng
backer. against
de-Maotzation

Cmdr., Mukden
MR

Close to Hua

Vice-Prem1er

NPC- National People's Congress: MAC- Militory Afta•rs Commfssoon, PlA- People ·s liberation Army; SC- Slandina Committee. CC- Central Comm•ttee: MR- Militory Re1lon .

•

SOURCES: Fact•onalllilnmenls and •nformat•on on pos•t•ons occup•ed are ~sed on press reports lrom Ch1n1. Honakont. and Ta•wan. ancl on olher •nlormat•on avllltble 1o the author
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Table 2: Province-level Party First Secretaries
Purged or Demoted Since October 1976
Locality

Name

Date

Anhui
Gansu
Guizhou

Song Peichang
Xian Henghan
Lu Ruilin

Late76
Early 77
3177

Hebei
Heilongjiang
Henan
Hubei
Jilin

Liu Zihou
Wang Jiadao
Liu Guangtao
Liu Jianxun
Zhao Xinchu
Wang Huaixiang

3/80
2177
12/77
10/78
6178
2177

Liaoning
Beijing
Shaanxi

Zeng Shaoshan
Wu De
Li Ruishan

9178
10178
12178

Shandong
Shanghai

Pai Juping
Zhang Chunqiao

12/80
10176

Shanxi
Tianjin
Xizang
Xinjiang
Yunnan
Beijing

Wang Qian
Xie Xuegong
Ren Rong
Seypedin
Jia Qiyun
Lin Hujia

11180
6178

Remarks

Last iden. 10/77
Dep. Pol. Com'sar
Canton Mil. Reg.

Minister of Food
Last iden. 7177
Dep. Pol. Com'sar
Wuhan Mil. Reg.

Vice-Dir., State
Agric. Com.
Leader of the
gang of four

5180

1178
2177
2/81

Vice-chmn, NPC Standing C'tee
Minister of Agriculture
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TABLE 3: CHINA'S AGING ELITE (1981)
1.

2.

Politburo
Chairman
Vice-Chairmen

Hu Yaobang
Ye Jianying
Deng Xiaoping
Zhao Ziyang
Chen Yun
Li Xiannian
Hua Guofeng
Members
Keng Biao
Wei Guoqing
Yu Qiuli
Peng Chong
Fang Yi
Ulan.hu
Xu Xiangqian
Nie Rongzhen
Liu Bocheng
Deng .Yingchao
Wang Chen
Peng Zhen
Xu Shiyou
Li Desheng
Zhang Tingfa
Ni Zhifu
Chen Yonggui
Alternate members Chen Muhua
Seypidin
Secretariat
General Secretary Hu Yaobang
Yu Qiuli
Secretaries
Peng Chong
Fang Yi
Yang Dezhi
Yao Yilin
Wan Li
GuMu
Hu Qiaomu,
Song Renqiong
Wang Renzhong
Xi Zhongxun

66
84
77
62
76
76
60
72
75
67
66
65
78
79
82
84
78
73
79
75
mid-60s
mid-60s
mid-50s
63
late 50s
65

66
67
66
65
71
64
65

67
69

72
64
68
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3.

State Council
Premier
Vice Premiers
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Zhao Ziyang
Wan Li
Keng Piao
Yu Qiuli
Fang Yi
Chen Muhua
Yao Yilin
Ji Pengfei
Zhang Aiging
Bo Yibo
Kang Shien
KuMu
Huang Hua
Yang Qingjen

62
65
72
67
65
late 50s
64
71
71

74
65
67

66
76
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